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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge. 
 
Following a decision of the District Court granting 
summary judgment to GlaxoSmithKline LLC (“GSK”), the 
losing parties, two health benefit plans, appealed from that 
final order.1  While briefing the appeal, the parties sought to 
include in their joint appendix certain documents filed in 
connection with the summary judgment proceedings.  GSK had 
previously designated some of these documents as confidential 
and contended that they should remain so on appeal; the plans 
disagreed.  That led GSK to ask the District Court, on two 
occasions and pursuant to the applicable protective order, to 
maintain the confidentiality of certain documents.  The plans 
opposed these requests, arguing that the common law right of 
access and the First Amendment right of public access required 
the unsealing of the documents.  The District Court largely 
sided with GSK, refusing to unseal most of the documents.  
The plans have appealed the District Court’s two post-
judgment sealing orders. 
                                                 
1 We are separately considering that appeal, No. 18-
1010, which challenges the District Court’s summary 
judgment ruling. 
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We conclude that the District Court failed to apply the 
proper legal standard for the common law right of access, 
which requires as a starting point the application of a 
presumption of public access.  See Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & 
Sav. Ass’n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 344 (3d 
Cir. 1986).  By applying, instead, our standard for a protective 
order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, the able 
District Judge incorrectly placed a burden on the plans to show 
an interest in disclosure—rather than on GSK to justify 
continued sealing.  We will therefore vacate and remand to 
allow the District Court to consider GSK’s motions for 
continued confidentiality under the appropriate standard. 
I.2 
A. 
GSK manufactures, markets, and sells Avandia, a drug 
indicated to treat Type II diabetes.3  In re Avandia Mktg., Sales 
Prac. & Prod. Liab. Litig. (Avandia I), 804 F.3d 633, 635 (3d 
Cir. 2015).  The plans contend that GSK concealed evidence 
of Avandia’s cardiovascular risk and, instead, promoted 
                                                 
2 As previously mentioned, the plans have separately 
appealed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  We 
therefore recount only the limited facts and procedural history 
necessary to decide the sealing issues. 
3 The word “indicated” is a term of art within the 
pharmaceutical industry meaning to use a drug or device for an 
approved purpose.  Cf. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal 
Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 345–46 (2001). 
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Avandia as providing cardiovascular benefits.  According to 
the plans, this marketing strategy was false and misleading 
because GSK’s own studies showed that Avandia increased 
certain markers of cardiovascular risk.  The plans assert that, 
for years, GSK buried bad study results, misrepresented the 
truth about Avandia’s cardiovascular profile to doctors and 
pharmacy benefit managers, and reaped billions of dollars in 
profits.  In 2007, an independent researcher published an article 
in the New England Journal of Medicine claiming that Avandia 
increased the risk of heart attack and cardiovascular disease.  
Id.; App. 1064.  Lawsuits ensued, the United States Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) investigated, and even the 
United States Senate Finance Committee released a report 
revealing GSK’s misdeeds. 
B. 
On May 21, 2010, in the midst of heightened regulatory 
and public scrutiny of Avandia, United Food and Commercial 
Workers Local 1776 and Participating Employers Health and 
Welfare Fund (“UFCW”) filed suit against GSK in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  
UFCW alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), as well as various state 
consumer protection laws.  J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc. 
(“J.B. Hunt”) filed a complaint containing similar claims on 
June 20, 2011.  Both UFCW and J.B. Hunt (collectively 
referred to as “the plans”) filed suit on behalf of a proposed 
class of United States health benefit providers that had 
purchased Avandia.  These third-party payor cases became part 
of a multi-district litigation (“MDL”), which also included 
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consumer and personal injury cases.4  As part of the MDL, the 
cases were governed by a protective order, PTO 10, which 
covered discovery of confidential materials. 
In November 2010, GSK moved to dismiss the plans’ 
complaints, arguing that the plans lacked standing to bring 
RICO claims.  In October 2013, the District Court denied that 
motion; it later certified its decision for interlocutory appeal.  
We granted permission to appeal and, in October 2015, 
affirmed the District Court’s denial of GSK’s motion to 
dismiss.  Avandia I, 804 F.3d at 646. 
Less than a year later, GSK moved for summary 
judgment as to the plans’ consumer protection claims on 
federal preemption grounds.  GSK also contended that the 
plans’ RICO claims should be dismissed for failing to identify 
a distinct RICO enterprise.  In the course of briefing GSK’s 
motion for summary judgment, the parties filed documents 
under seal pursuant to PTO 10.  At that time, neither party 
raised any issue as to the confidentiality of the sealed exhibits.  
On December 7, 2017, the District Court granted GSK’s 
motion for summary judgment. 
After the plans appealed the District Court’s summary 
judgment ruling, GSK indicated that it wanted to maintain the 
confidentiality of certain sealed documents that had been filed 
in connection with the summary judgment motion.  GSK 
therefore moved in the District Court to keep some of the 
                                                 
4 District Judge Rufe has presided over the Avandia 
MDL with commendable care and efficiency since October 
2007. 
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summary judgment records under seal.  On May 31, 2018, the 
District Court granted in part and denied in part GSK’s motion 
(the “May Sealing Order”).  App. 2459.  The Court unsealed 
its own summary judgment opinion but maintained the 
confidentiality of the remainder of the documents.  Id. 
A few weeks later, GSK again moved to maintain under 
seal additional summary judgment records.  The District Court 
granted in part and denied in part the second sealing motion on 
July 24, 2018 (the “July Sealing Order”).  Id. at 2460–61.  The 
Court directed GSK to file a redacted statement of undisputed 
material facts but otherwise maintained the seal.  Id. 
The plans timely appealed the May Sealing Order (No. 
18-2259) and the July Sealing Order (No. 18-2656). 
II. 
We apply three distinct standards when considering 
various challenges to the confidentiality of documents.  We 
apply the factors articulated in Pansy v. Borough of 
Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 783–92 (3d Cir. 1994), when we 
review orders preserving the confidentiality of discovery 
materials pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.  But 
we apply the more rigorous common law right of access when 
discovery materials are filed as court documents.  In addition 
to recognizing fewer reasons to justify the sealing of court 
records, the public right of access—unlike a Rule 26 inquiry—
begins with a presumption in favor of public access.  Goldstein 
v. Forbes (In re Cendant Corp.), 260 F.3d 183, 192–93 (3d Cir. 
2001).  Finally, the First Amendment right of public access 
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attaches to, inter alia, civil trials.  Publicker Indus., Inc. v. 
Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir. 1984).  We will discuss 
each standard in turn. 
A. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) permits the 
District Court to enter a protective order to shield a party “from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
expense.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).  A protective order is 
“intended to offer litigants a measure of privacy, while 
balancing against this privacy interest the public’s right to 
obtain information concerning judicial proceedings.”  Pansy, 
23 F.3d at 786.  A protective order may apply to all litigation 
materials—not just those filed in court—because “[c]ourts 
have inherent power to grant orders of confidentiality over 
materials not in the court file.”  Id. at 785. 
The proponent of the protective order shoulders “[t]he 
burden of justifying the confidentiality of each and every 
document sought to be” sealed.5  Id. at 786–87.  The District 
Court “must balance the requesting party’s need for 
                                                 
5 As we have previously stated, “in cases involving 
large-scale discovery, the court may construct a broad umbrella 
protective order upon a threshold showing by the movant of 
good cause.”  Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 
787 n.17 (3d Cir. 1994).  Once a party challenges the protective 
order, however, “the party seeking to maintain the seal” must 
justify the continued sealing of those documents.  Id.  At that 
point, the district court must conduct a document-by-document 
review. 
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information against the injury that might result if uncontrolled 
disclosure is compelled.”  Id. at 787.  The party seeking a 
protective order “over discovery material must demonstrate 
that ‘good cause’ exists for the order.”  Id. at 786 (quoting Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 26(c)); see also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 
U.S. 20, 37 (1984) (holding that the good cause requirement 
for protective orders does not violate the First Amendment).  
Good cause means “that disclosure will work a clearly defined 
and serious injury to the party seeking closure.  The injury must 
be shown with specificity.”  Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786 (quoting 
Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1071).  To that end, “[b]road 
allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or 
articulated reasoning, do not support a good cause showing.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
We have set forth various factors—“which are neither 
mandatory nor exhaustive”—that courts may consider when 
determining whether good cause exists and, by extension, 
whether a protective order should issue: 
1. whether disclosure will violate any 
privacy interests; 
2. whether the information is being sought 
for a legitimate purpose or for an 
improper purpose; 
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3. whether disclosure of the information will 
cause a party embarrassment;6 
4. whether confidentiality is being sought 
over information important to public 
health and safety; 
5. whether the sharing of information among 
litigants will promote fairness and 
efficiency; 
6. whether a party benefitting from the order 
of confidentiality is a public entity or 
official; and 
7. whether the case involves issues 
important to the public. 
Glenmede Tr. Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 
1995) (citing Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787–91).  The District Court 
“is best situated to determine what factors are relevant to” any 
                                                 
6 Although “preventing embarrassment may be a factor 
satisfying the ‘good cause’ standard,” the proponent of a 
protective order “must demonstrate that the embarrassment 
will be particularly serious.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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given dispute.7  Id.  The Court’s analysis, however, “should 
always reflect a balancing of private versus public interests.”  
Id.  The District Court “should articulate on the record findings 
supporting its” decision to grant or deny a protective order.  
Pansy, 23 F.3d at 789. 
B. 
Analytically distinct from the District Court’s ability to 
protect discovery materials under Rule 26(c), the common law 
presumes that the public has a right of access to judicial 
materials.  In both criminal and civil cases, a common law right 
of access attaches “to judicial proceedings and records.”  In re 
Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 192.  The common law right of 
access “antedates the Constitution.”  Bank of Am., 800 F.2d at 
343.  The right of access “promotes public confidence in the 
judicial system by enhancing testimonial trustworthiness and 
the quality of justice dispensed by the court.”  Littlejohn v. BIC 
Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988).  Public observation 
facilitated by the right of access “diminishes possibilities for 
injustice, incompetence, perjury, and fraud.”  Id.  Moreover, 
“the very openness of the process should provide the public 
with a more complete understanding of the judicial system and 
a better perception of its fairness.”  Id. 
                                                 
7 The Court also “retains the power to modify or lift 
confidentiality orders that it has entered.”  Id. at 784.  When 
deciding whether to modify a protective order, the District 
Court should consider reliance by the original parties.  Id. at 
789–90. 
 12 
 
The right of access includes the right to attend court 
proceedings and to “inspect and copy public records and 
documents, including judicial records and documents.”  In re 
Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 192.  Whether the common law 
right of access applies to a particular document or record “turns 
on whether that item is considered to be a ‘judicial record.’”  
Id.  A “judicial record” is a document that “has been filed with 
the court . . . or otherwise somehow incorporated or integrated 
into a district court’s adjudicatory proceedings.”  Id.  Once a 
document becomes a judicial record, a presumption of access 
attaches.  See id. at 192–93. 
“[T]here is a presumptive right of public access to 
pretrial motions of a nondiscovery nature, whether preliminary 
or dispositive, and the material filed in connection therewith.”  
Id.  Summary judgment proceedings are no exception—
documents filed in connection with a motion for summary 
judgment are judicial records.  Republic of the Philippines v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 660–62 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
Yet the common law right of access is “not absolute.”  
Bank of Am., 800 F.2d at 344.  “The presumption [of access] is 
just that, and thus may be rebutted.”  Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 949 F.2d at 662.  The party seeking to overcome the 
presumption of access bears the burden of showing “that the 
interest in secrecy outweighs the presumption.”  Bank of Am., 
800 F.2d at 344.  The movant must show “that the material is 
the kind of information that courts will protect and that 
disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the 
party seeking closure.”  Miller v. Ind. Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 551 
(3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The “strong 
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presumption of openness does not permit the routine closing of 
judicial records to the public.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
To overcome that strong presumption, the District Court 
must articulate “the compelling, countervailing interests to be 
protected,” make “specific findings on the record concerning 
the effects of disclosure,” and “provide[] an opportunity for 
interested third parties to be heard.”  In re Cendant Corp., 260 
F.3d at 194 (emphasis omitted).  “In delineating the injury to 
be prevented, specificity is essential.”  Id.  “Broad allegations 
of harm, bereft of specific examples or articulated reasoning, 
are insufficient.”  Id.  “[C]areful factfinding and balancing of 
competing interests is required before the strong presumption 
of openness can be overcome by the secrecy interests of private 
litigants.”  Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 
F.2d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 1993).  To that end, the District Court 
must “conduct[] a document-by-document review” of the 
contents of the challenged documents.”  Id. 
C. 
Finally, the public and the press have a First 
Amendment right of access to civil trials.  Publicker Indus., 
733 F.2d at 1070.  Although the constitutional right of access 
is “not absolute, . . . as a First Amendment right it is to be 
accorded the due process protection that other fundamental 
rights enjoy.”  Id. 
It remains an open question in this Circuit whether the 
First Amendment right of access applies to records of summary 
judgment proceedings.  We use a two-prong test to assess 
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whether the right of access attaches:  (1) the experience prong 
asks “whether the place and process have historically been 
open to the press”; and (2) the logic prong evaluates “whether 
public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning 
of the particular process in question.”  N. Jersey Media Grp. 
Inc. v. United States, 836 F.3d 421, 429 (3d Cir. 2016).  If both 
prongs “are satisfied, a qualified First Amendment right of 
public access attaches.”  Id.; see also PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 
705 F.3d 91, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that the experience 
and logic test “balances the interests of the People in observing 
and monitoring the functions of their government against the 
government’s interest and/or long-standing historical practice 
of keeping certain information from public scrutiny”). 
“The First Amendment right of access requires a much 
higher showing than the common law right [of] access before 
a judicial proceeding can be sealed.”  In re Cendant Corp., 260 
F.3d at 198 n.13.  Any restriction on the right of public access 
“is . . . evaluated under strict scrutiny.”  PG Publ’g Co., 705 
F.3d at 104.  If the First Amendment right of access applies, 
“there is a presumption that the proceedings will be open to the 
public.”  Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1073.  The party seeking 
closure may rebut the presumption of openness only if able to 
demonstrate “an overriding interest [in excluding the public] 
based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher 
values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”  Id.; see 
also id. at 1070 (explaining that “to limit the public’s access to 
civil trials there must be a showing that the denial serves an 
important governmental interest and that there is no less 
restrictive way to serve that governmental interest”). 
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The party seeking closure or sealing in the face of the 
First Amendment right of access “bears the burden of showing 
that the material is the kind of information that courts will 
protect and that there is good cause for the order to issue.”  Id. 
at 1071.  Good cause means “that disclosure will work a clearly 
defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure”; “[t]he 
injury must be shown with specificity.”  Id.  “For example, an 
interest in safeguarding a trade secret may overcome a 
presumption of openness.”  Id. at 1073.  Bad business 
practices, in the absence of other circumstances, do not 
overcome the presumption.  Id. at 1074. 
Procedurally, the District Court “must both articulate 
the countervailing interest it seeks to protect and make findings 
specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether 
the closure order was properly entered.”  Id. at 1071 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Absent those findings, we will not 
“speculate” as to the District Court’s reasoning.  Id. at 1072. 
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III.8 
A. 
Although the plans invoked the common law right of 
access, the District Court assessed GSK’s motions for 
continued confidentiality by applying the Rule 26 standard 
governing protective orders.  In its one-page May Sealing 
Order, the District Court granted in part and denied in part 
GSK’s motion to preserve the confidentiality of the summary 
judgment records.  App. 2459.  The Court denied GSK’s 
motion with respect to the summary judgment opinion, which 
the Court unsealed without redaction.  The Court granted the 
motion as to all other documents.  In doing so, the District 
Court neither cited the applicable legal standard nor discussed 
the specific documents at issue.  The Court later explained that 
its reasoning in the July Sealing Order applied equally to the 
May Sealing Order. 
In its July Sealing Order, the Court again granted in part 
and denied in part GSK’s second motion to maintain 
confidentiality.  Id. at 2460–61.  The District Court ordered 
GSK to file a redacted version of its statement of undisputed 
material facts.  The Court otherwise granted the motion for 
                                                 
8 We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review the District Court’s decision to deny the right of access 
for abuse of discretion.  See Goldstein v. Forbes (In re Cendant 
Corp.), 260 F.3d 183, 197 (3d Cir. 2001); Bank of Am. Nat’l 
Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 
344 (3d Cir. 1986).  We exercise plenary review over the legal 
questions presented in this appeal.  See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 776. 
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continued confidentiality.  In a footnote, the District Court 
quoted the Pansy factors, explaining that this Court has 
instructed district courts to weigh the factors when determining 
whether good cause exists to justify a protective order under 
Rule 26.  The District Court mentioned the common law right 
of access, acknowledging that the moving party must show that 
disclosure “will work a clearly defined and serious injury to 
it.”  Id. at 2460 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Miller, 16 F.3d at 551).  But the District Court reasoned that 
both the Rule 26 standard and the common law right of access 
doctrine required “identifying the harm to the designating party 
and balancing the [Pansy] factors.”  Id. at 2460–61 n.1 (citing 
LEAP Sys., Inc. v. MoneyTrax, Inc., 638 F.3d 216, 222–23 (3d 
Cir. 2011)). 
The District Court’s analysis, contained in the same 
footnote, went as follows: 
In this case, [GSK] has articulated a specific and 
substantial harm from making public its 
confidential communications to the FDA, 
including harm to its competitive standing, to its 
commercial reputation, and to its relationships 
with physicians and patients.  [GSK] is thus 
seeking to preserve the confidentiality of these 
documents for a legitimate purpose.  Given the 
potential harm to [GSK] by disclosing these 
communications with the FDA, and the fact that 
there are no substantial countervailing interests 
other than the public’s broad right to review a 
judicial proceeding, the Court will grant [GSK]’s 
Motion with respect to the identified documents 
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containing communications with the FDA.  The 
Court will deny the motion, however, with 
respect to preserving the confidentiality of the 
entirety of the submitted statement of undisputed 
facts.  [GSK] may redact the confidential 
communications with the FDA contained in the 
statement of undisputed facts, but [GSK] ha[s] 
not demonstrated why the full submission should 
be kept confidential. 
Id. at 2461 n.1 (internal citations omitted).  The Court 
acknowledged that its rulings had “no bearing on the 
confidentiality designation such documents are given on 
appeal.”9  Id. 
B. 
It is undisputed that each of the challenged documents 
are “judicial records” subject to the common law right of 
access because the parties filed the documents on the District 
Court’s public docket in support of, or in opposition to, GSK’s 
motion for summary judgment.  See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
949 F.2d at 660–61.  As such, the District Court was obligated 
                                                 
9 To that end, the parties have briefed the sealing of 
certain appendices on appeal.  Because our assessment of the 
appellate motions to seal overlaps with the District Court’s 
analysis on remand, we will defer such an assessment until 
after the District Court has had the opportunity to consider 
GSK’s motions under the correct standard.  All disputed 
documents filed in this appeal will continue to be held 
provisionally under seal. 
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to apply the exacting common law right of access standard, 
including the “strong presumption” of access, before granting 
GSK’s motions for continued confidentiality.  In failing to do 
so, the learned District Judge erred.10  Instead, by conflating 
the Pansy factors with the standard governing the common law 
right of access, the District Court gave no effect to the 
presumption of public access. 
The District Court, relying on LEAP Systems, seems to 
have considered the Pansy factors as the only applicable legal 
standard, equating the Rule 26 analysis with the common law 
right of access analysis.  But LEAP Systems does not support 
such an approach.  There, after years of contentious litigation 
and failed mediation attempts, the parties entered into a 
settlement agreement with the district court’s assistance.  
LEAP Sys., Inc., 638 F.3d at 218, 221.  Fearing that the deal 
would soon unravel, the parties recorded a transcript 
containing the terms of the settlement agreement.  Id. at 218.  
                                                 
10 Even under the more lenient standard for a protective 
order, the District Court’s analysis would not be sufficient.  We 
have repeatedly counseled that the party seeking 
confidentiality must bear the burden of justifying sealing.  
Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 
166 (3d Cir. 1993).  Once sealing is challenged, the proponent 
of sealing “must make a particularized showing of the need for 
continued secrecy if the documents are to remain under seal.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The District Court must 
then undertake “a document-by-document review,” id. at 167, 
to ascertain whether continued sealing is proper and “articulate 
on the record findings” to support its decision, Pansy, 23 F.3d 
at 789. 
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The parties repeatedly asked the district court if the settlement 
terms would remain under seal; the district court repeatedly 
assured them that the terms would be kept confidential.  Id.  
But the parties filed the transcript in the district court, and a 
third party intervened to unseal the transcript.  Id. at 218–19.  
The district court recognized that, once the parties had filed the 
transcript, it became a judicial record subject to the common 
law right of access.  Id. at 219.  The court reasoned, however, 
that the parties’ interest in preventing competitors from using 
proprietary information contained in the transcript—coupled 
with their reliance on the district court’s assurances of 
confidentiality—outweighed the intervenor’s interest in the 
terms of the settlement agreement.  Id. 
Reviewing for abuse of discretion, we agreed.  Id. at 
223.  We recognized the “strong presumption in favor of public 
accessibility” and agreed that a party’s “vague assertions that 
the transcript contains secretive business information, and that 
disclosure would render [it] at a tactical disadvantage” were 
insufficient to overcome that strong presumption.  Id. at 221–
22 (internal quotation marks omitted).  We found persuasive, 
however, the district court’s specific finding that the parties 
“would not have entered into the settlement agreements but for 
the [c]ourt’s assurance of confidentiality.”  Id. at 222.  Given 
the circumstances, we concluded that the parties’ “reliance on 
the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s assurances of confidentiality [was] 
entirely reasonable and sufficient to outweigh the public’s 
common law right of access.”  Id. 
Weighing the public’s interest in disclosure, we 
considered the district court’s reliance on some of the Pansy 
factors:  whether confidentiality was being sought over 
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information important to public health and safety, whether the 
sharing of information among litigants would promote fairness 
and efficiency, whether the party benefitting from the order of 
confidentiality was a public entity or official, and whether the 
case involved issues important to the public.  See id.  We 
discerned no error in the district court’s conclusion that the 
public’s interest in disclosure under the common law right of 
access had been rebutted.  Id. at 222–23. 
Nowhere in LEAP Systems did we hold that the Pansy 
factors supplanted our longstanding common law right of 
access standard.  Rather, we determined that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion by weighing some of these factors 
when considering the public’s interest in disclosure.  In short, 
while the Pansy factors may provide useful guidance for courts 
conducting the balancing required by the common law test, the 
Pansy factors do not displace the common law right of access 
standard.  The difference is not merely semantic—the Pansy 
factors are not sufficiently robust for assessing the public’s 
right to access judicial records.  Unlike the Rule 26 standard, 
the common law right of access begins with a thumb on the 
scale in favor of openness—the strong presumption of public 
access.  Compare Pansy, 23 F.3d at 780–83 (discussing the 
common law right of access doctrine and recognizing the 
presumption of access), with id. at 783–92 (discussing the 
standard applicable to protective orders and enumerating the 
Pansy factors). 
Moreover, some of the Pansy factors are incompatible 
with our case law on the common law right of access.  One of 
the Pansy factors assesses “whether disclosure of the 
information will cause a party embarrassment.”  Glenmede Tr. 
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Co., 56 F.3d at 483.  But we have repeatedly said that concern 
about a company’s public image, embarrassment, or 
reputational injury, without more, is insufficient to rebut the 
presumption of public access.  Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 
F.2d at 663; see also Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 685 (reasoning that 
the proponent of the seal’s “desire to preserve corporate 
reputation” is insufficient to rebut the presumption); Publicker 
Indus., 733 F.2d at 1074 (explaining that public disclosure of 
poor management is inadequate to justify sealing); Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 710 F.2d 
1165, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983) (explaining that the desire to shield 
prejudicial information from competitors and the public is 
understandable, but “cannot be accommodated by courts 
without seriously undermining the tradition of an open judicial 
system”). 
Pansy also considers “whether the information is being 
sought for a legitimate purpose or for an improper purpose.”  
Glenmede Tr. Co., 56 F.3d at 483.  But a person’s motive for 
inspecting or copying judicial records is irrelevant under the 
common law right of access.  See Leucadia, Inc., 998 F.2d at 
167–68; see also Bank of Am., 800 F.2d at 345 (“The 
applicability and importance of these interests [served by the 
common law right of access] are not lessened because they are 
asserted by a private party to advance its own interests . . . .”). 
We conclude that by conflating the Pansy factors with 
the common law right of access standard, the District Court 
committed an error of law. 
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C. 
Having explained that the Pansy factors are not a 
substitute for the common law right of access standard—which 
begins with the presumption of access—we turn to whether the 
District Court nonetheless applied the strong presumption 
required by the common law right of access.  We conclude that 
it did not, and we must therefore remand. 
As noted above, the District Court did acknowledge the 
common law right of access.  It failed, however, to 
acknowledge the presumption of public accessibility.  It 
reasoned that continued sealing is proper given that “there are 
no substantial countervailing interests other than the public’s 
broad right to review a judicial proceeding.”  App. 2461 n.1 
(emphasis added).  This analysis gave insufficient weight to the 
public’s interest in openness.  Consideration of the public’s 
right of access must be the starting point, not just one of 
multiple factors.  The scale is tipped at the outset in favor of 
access.  And the right of access is not a mere formality—it 
“promotes public confidence in the judicial system”; 
“diminishes possibilities for injustice, incompetence, perjury, 
and fraud”; and “provide[s] the public with a more complete 
understanding of the judicial system and a better perception of 
its fairness.”  Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 678.  These interests are 
particularly important in a case such as this one, which 
implicates the public’s trust in a well-known and (formerly) 
widely-used drug.  By giving insufficient weight to the public’s 
strong interest in the openness of judicial records, the District 
Court erred as a matter of law in applying the common law 
right of access. 
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The District Court also erred by not conducting a 
document-by-document review, instead analyzing sixty-five 
disputed documents in a single paragraph contained in a 
footnote.  This collective evaluation of the harm allegedly 
suffered by GSK falls short of the exacting analysis our 
precedent requires.  See Leucadia, Inc., 998 F.2d at 167 
(explaining that the district court’s broad-brush approach “was 
inconsistent with our prior statements that careful factfinding 
and balancing of competing interests is required before the 
strong presumption of openness can be overcome by the 
secrecy interests of private litigants”).11 
Again, the strong presumption of openness inherent in 
the common law right of access “disallows the routine and 
perfunctory closing of judicial records.”  In re Cendant Corp., 
260 F.3d at 193–94.  To overcome the presumption, GSK must 
show that “the material is the kind of information that courts 
will protect and that disclosure will work a clearly defined and 
serious injury to the party seeking closure.”  Miller, 16 F.3d at 
551 (internal quotation marks omitted).  And on remand, the 
District Court should articulate “the compelling[,] 
countervailing interests to be protected,” make “specific 
                                                 
11 To be clear, we do not require a district court to 
provide lengthy, detailed discussion of each individual 
document.  Yet it must be clear from the record that the district 
court engaged in a particularized, deliberate assessment of the 
standard as it applies to each disputed document.  We are 
unable to discern such exacting review from the single 
paragraph provided in the July Sealing Order, in which a 
multitude of documents spanning several years were divided 
into broad categories. 
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findings on the record concerning the effects of disclosure, and 
provide[] an opportunity for interested third parties to be 
heard.”  In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 194 (emphasis and 
internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 197–98 (holding 
that the district court abused its discretion in sealing bids for 
lead class counsel because the court “did not provide any clear 
reason for why it sealed the bids,” “did not recognize the 
presumption of access,” and did not “engage in [the] balancing 
process to determine whether the bids were the type of 
information normally protected or whether there was a clearly 
defined injury to be prevented”). 
D. 
In remanding for the District Court to apply the 
appropriate standard in the first instance, we offer a few 
observations about the evidence GSK submitted in support of 
sealing.  To support its requests for continued confidentiality, 
GSK provided an eight-year-old declaration—the Armand 
Declaration—which actually supported sealing a different set 
of documents.12  Outdated evidence such as this is insufficient 
                                                 
12 The declaration of former Executive Product Director 
for Avandia, Timothy Armand, was originally submitted in 
support of a 2010 challenge to the confidentiality of 
documents.  Although GSK argues that “the same types of 
documents” covered by the Armand Declaration are at issue 
here, Br. of Appellee 40, we have no way to verify that 
assertion.  See Br. of Appellants 25 n.93 (explaining that the 
Armand Declaration references documents by Bates numbers, 
which are then listed on a separate appendix not provided to 
the plans or the Court). 
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to overcome the presumption of public access.  See Miller, 16 
F.3d at 551–52 (instructing courts that, even if the initial 
sealing of documents was justified, they should “closely 
examine whether circumstances have changed sufficiently to 
allow the presumption allowing access to court records to 
prevail”); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d at 663 
(explaining that Westinghouse’s reliance on old affidavits 
“without any current evidence to show how public 
dissemination of the pertinent materials now would cause the 
competitive harm it claims” is insufficient to meet the exacting 
common law burden).  “[S]ealing must be based on current 
evidence to show how public dissemination of the pertinent 
materials now would cause the competitive harm.”  In re 
Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 196 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
Perhaps realizing the deficiencies of the Armand 
Declaration, GSK submitted a second declaration in its reply 
brief in support of its second motion to seal.  This declaration, 
the Walker Declaration, contains broad, vague, and conclusory 
allegations of harm that are, standing alone, insufficient to 
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overcome the presumption of public access.13  For example, 
the Walker Declaration claims that disclosure of GSK’s old 
research strategies “would still aid competitors in developing 
research strategies and could be used to harm GSK’s 
relationship with patients and physicians.”  S.A. 1956, ¶ 31 
(emphasis added).  The Walker Declaration does not explain, 
however, how twenty-year-old research strategies could assist 
current competitors or harm GSK’s current relationships with 
patients and physicians.  These blanket assertions of harm that 
“could” come to fruition fall short of the clearly defined and 
serious injury that GSK must articulate to obtain sealing under 
any standard. 
Finally, it seems that GSK is relying on allegations of 
reputational injury to support continued confidentiality.  For 
example, the District Court discussed the “harm to [GSK’s] 
competitive standing, to its commercial reputation, and to its 
relationships with physicians and patients.”  App. 2461 n.1.  To 
be sure, courts may permissibly seal judicial records “where 
they are sources of business information that might harm a 
litigant’s competitive standing.”  Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
                                                 
13 The plans urge us to disregard entirely the Walker 
Declaration because it was inappropriately submitted on reply.  
The plans argue that they raised the deficiencies of the Armand 
Declaration in their opposition to the first sealing motion but 
that GSK failed to submit the Walker Declaration, which was 
designed to correct those deficiencies, until its reply to the 
second sealing motion.  Because we will remand for the 
District Court’s consideration of GSK’s first and second 
sealing motions, we leave for that Court to decide whether to 
consider the Walker Declaration. 
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949 F.2d at 662 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, 
however, the District Court did not articulate—and we are 
unable to see—how the purported harm to GSK’s competitive 
standing chalks up to anything more than mere 
embarrassment.14  Mere embarrassment is insufficient to 
overcome the strong presumption of public access inherent in 
the common law right.  Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1074 
(explaining that courts generally should not seal evidence of 
“bad business practice[s]”); see Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 710 F.2d at 1180 (“Indeed, common sense tells us that 
the greater the motivation a corporation has to shield its 
operations, the greater the public’s need to know.”). 
We will vacate the May and July Sealing Orders and 
remand this matter to permit the District Court to conduct a 
detailed review of the challenged documents by applying the 
proper standard for accessibility under the common law.  See 
Leucadia, Inc., 998 F.2d at 167 (emphasizing that “the required 
balancing should be done in the first instance by the district 
court”). 
                                                 
14 GSK has not claimed that any of the sealed documents 
contain trade secrets—a noted exception to the presumption of 
public access.  Confidential business information “is not 
entitled to the same level of protection from disclosure as trade 
secret information.”  Republic of the Philippines v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 663 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(quoting Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 685 (3d Cir. 
1988)). 
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E. 
The plans and amici have asked us to go further.  
According to them, the First Amendment right of public access 
applies to summary judgment records.  But, whereas we have 
extended the common law right of access to summary 
judgment records, we have yet to do so under the First 
Amendment right of public access.15 
We have repeatedly declined to tackle the contours of 
the First Amendment right of public access when the common 
law right has been sufficient to permit access.  See, e.g., In re 
Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 198 n.13 (declining to reach the 
First Amendment issue because the District Court’s order 
failed to satisfy the requirements for abridging the common 
law right of access, “the parameters of the First Amendment 
right of access to civil proceedings are undefined,” and 
“significant constitutional questions” remain as to “what 
documents are subject to its reach”); Leucadia, Inc., 998 F.2d 
at 161 n.6 (declining to reach the First Amendment right of 
access and instead “limit[ing] our inquiry to the common 
law”); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d at 659 (declining to 
                                                 
15 Two of our sister circuits have held that the First 
Amendment right of public access applies to summary 
judgment documents.  See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of 
Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2006); Rushford v. New 
Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988).  But 
see In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 
1325, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (declining to extend a pre-
judgment First Amendment right of access to summary 
judgment documents). 
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reach the First Amendment right of access and instead 
“confin[ing] our analysis to the common law”); Littlejohn, 851 
F.2d at 677 n.8 (declining to reach the First Amendment right 
of access because “[w]e can dispose of most of the parties’ 
contentions without reaching the constitutional issue”); Bank 
of Am., 800 F.2d at 343 (ruling that the common law right of 
access is applicable and declining to decide whether a right to 
access certain records “might also be grounded on the First 
Amendment”). 
Although the constitutional issue is an interesting one, 
we again decline to define the parameters of the First 
Amendment right in a case where the common law right 
affords sufficient protection.  Indeed, at oral argument counsel 
for the plans agreed that we need not reach the First 
Amendment issue if unsealing is required under the common 
law right of access.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 3:24–4:13, (Mar. 6, 
2019); see also In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 198 n.13 
(citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 547 (1974), for the 
proposition that “a federal court should not decide federal 
constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional 
ground is available”). 
If on remand the District Court concludes that any of the 
sealed documents merits continued confidentiality under the 
common law right of access, then the Court should also 
consider the parties’ arguments regarding the First Amendment 
 31 
 
right of public access.16  At this juncture, we discern no need 
to express an opinion as to whether the First Amendment right 
of public access extends to summary judgment documents. 
IV. 
Instead of applying the common law right of access, the 
District Court assessed GSK’s motions for continued 
confidentiality using the rule applicable to protective orders.  
Because the District Court should conduct the required 
document-by-document review under the correct legal 
standard in the first instance, we will vacate and remand the 
May Sealing Order as well as the July Sealing Order. 
 
                                                 
16 Because we do not reach the First Amendment issue, 
we decline to address GSK’s arguments that the plans lack 
Article III standing to assert First Amendment claims, or that 
they have partially waived these claims. 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
I join the majority opinion in its entirety, with the 
exception of Part III.E.  In that portion of the opinion, the 
majority, as a matter of constitutional avoidance, “decline[s] to 
define the parameters of the First Amendment” because, in the 
majority’s view, “the common law right affords sufficient 
protection” in this case.  I depart from the majority because, in 
my view, the Court should address the First Amendment issues 
raised by the plans.  I write separately to express my view that 
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is inapplicable to the 
facts of this case and that the First Amendment right of public 
access extends to documents submitted in connection with 
motions for summary judgment. 
I. 
The Court could reach the First Amendment issues in 
this case without running afoul of the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance.  The Supreme Court indeed has counseled that 
federal courts “should not decide federal constitutional 
questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is 
available,” but, in my view, the majority has not given proper 
weight to the key modifier in that clause—“dispositive.”  
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 547 (1974).  In other words, 
federal courts should avoid deciding constitutional questions 
only when there is a nonconstitutional ground that “bring[s] 
about a final determination.”  Dispositive, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  While I agree with the majority 
that this case should be remanded for the District Court to 
apply the appropriate standard under the common law right of 
access, such a holding is not dispositive:  we cannot be certain 
that “the common law right affords sufficient protection” in 
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this case because the District Court will make that 
determination on a document-by-document basis on remand. 
The majority appears to acknowledge that our holding 
is not a final determination on the merits of this matter insofar 
as the majority recognizes that this litigation will continue, and 
the Court subsequently will be required to address the First 
Amendment issues, if the District Court finds on remand that 
certain of the sealed documents merit continued confidentiality 
under the more lenient common law right of access standard.  
In such an event, as one of our sister circuits has recognized, 
“[e]ach passing day” between the District Court’s decision to 
maintain the confidentiality of a sealed document and this 
Court’s eventual adjudication of the First Amendment issues 
“may constitute a separate and cognizable infringement of the 
First Amendment.”  Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 
F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Grove Fresh Distrib., 
Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994)).  
Thus, given the possibility that our present avoidance of the 
First Amendment issues may result in a potentially continual 
constitutional violation if, on remand, the District Court does 
not unseal particular documents, our holding cannot be fairly 
characterized as “dispositive.”  For that reason, we should 
address the First Amendment issues raised by the plans. 
The cases cited by the majority—in which this Court 
utilized only the common law right of access standard, rather 
than the more rigorous First Amendment standard—do not 
persuade me otherwise.  In all but one of the cited cases, this 
Court definitively held that the documents in question should 
be unsealed pursuant to the common law right of access, 
leaving no room for doubt as to whether it might later become 
necessary to apply the more rigorous First Amendment 
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standard to unseal such documents.  See In re Cendant Corp., 
260 F.3d 183, 201 (3d Cir. 2001) (directing “the District Court 
[to] enter an order unsealing all sealed bids and documents in 
the record”); Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 665 (3d Cir. 1991) (denying a stay 
pending appeal of the district court’s order “unsealing the 
material filed in connection with Westinghouse’s motion for 
summary judgment”); Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 
687 (3d Cir. 1988) (affirming “the district court[’s] order 
granting [the Philadelphia Inquirer] access to the judicial 
records”); Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. Hotel 
Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 346 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(remanding to the district court with the direction to enter an 
order unsealing documents relating to a settlement agreement).  
Unlike this case, the Court, in each of the above-cited cases, 
did not remand to the district court to apply the appropriate 
standard under the common law right of access; rather, in each 
of the above-cited cases, the Court’s holding was dispositive of 
all the issues, and thus it was proper for the Court to decline to 
adjudicate First Amendment claims.  Further, in the remaining 
case cited by the majority, the appellant “d[id] not rely on the 
First Amendment as the basis for his claimed right of access to 
the discovery material,” and thus constitutional avoidance was 
not at issue.  Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 
998 F.2d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 1993).  In contrast, the plans and 
amici explicitly raised First Amendment issues in this case. 
For the reasons stated above, I respectfully disagree 
with the majority’s decision not to address the First 
Amendment issues raised by the plans in this case, and I would 
join our two sister circuits that took up this constitutional issue 
when it was presented to them in a similar posture.  See 
Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 124 (“[W]e may not avoid the question 
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of whether a First Amendment presumption of access also 
exists, for the Newspapers ask us to impose the higher 
constitutional burden in requiring disclosure.”); accord 
Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th 
Cir. 1988).  As a result of the Court’s holding, the adjudication 
of the First Amendment issues hinges on the outcome of the 
District Court’s fact-finding on remand, and, in the meantime, 
constitutional rights potentially are being abridged on a 
continual basis.  Such a result, in my view, is not dispositive of 
all the issues in this case, and therefore the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance does not bar us from reviewing the 
First Amendment issues raised by the plans. 
II. 
  Having determined that the Court should address the 
First Amendment issues raised by the plans,1 I would join the 
                                              
1 As an ancillary matter, GSK’s argument regarding the 
plans’ lack of “standing” is something of a misnomer.  This is 
not a case in which a named plaintiff failed to demonstrate 
Article III standing to bring the substantive claim in a 
complaint on behalf of a putative class; it is undisputed that the 
District Court has jurisdiction over the underlying matter.  
Rather, this appeal arises out of the District Court’s grant of 
two motions filed by GSK in the underlying matter to preserve 
the confidentiality of the documents submitted in connection 
with its motion for summary judgment.  The plans opposed 
both of these motions and, either explicitly or through citation 
to case law, raised (and, consequently, preserved) arguments 
with respect to the First Amendment right of public access.  
The plans—as the named plaintiffs in a putative class action—
are required to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
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Second and Fourth Circuits in holding that the First 
Amendment right of public access extends to documents filed 
in connection with motions for summary judgment.  See 
Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 124; Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253. 
 This Court previously has held that “the First 
Amendment, independent of the common law, protects the 
public’s right of access to the records of civil proceedings”—
specifically, civil trials.  Westinghouse, 949 F.2d at 659 (citing 
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 
1984)).  Since the Court first recognized a First Amendment 
right of public access to civil trials in Publicker, 733 F.2d 1059, 
however, summary judgment has played an increasingly 
prominent role in federal civil litigation.  As one distinguished 
jurist has noted, “[t]he expanding federal caseload has 
                                              
the class,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4), in order “to ensure that 
absentees’ interests are fully pursued,” Georgine v. Amchem 
Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 630 (3d Cir. 1996).  The obligation 
to protect the interests of the class undoubtedly extends to 
opposing motions—and appealing orders—that adversely 
affect the interests of absentee class members, whose interests 
are at issue in a “peculiar” way when litigation centers on the 
right of access.  See Cendant, 260 F.3d at 194 (holding that the 
“right of access should be applied . . . with particular strictness” 
due to “the peculiar posture of class actions whereby some 
members of the public are also parties to the class action”).  To 
accept GSK’s argument that the plans do not have “standing” 
to raise issues with respect to the First Amendment rights of 
absentee putative class members—who received notice of 
neither GSK’s motions nor the District Court’s orders and 
whose rights are peculiarly at issue—would be to contravene 
both the letter and spirit of Rule 23. 
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contributed to a drift in many areas of federal litigation toward 
substituting summary judgment for trial.”  Wallace v. SMC 
Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1397 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, 
C.J.).  This view has been echoed by commentators.  See, e.g., 
Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts 
About Summary Judgment, 100 Yale L.J. 73, 89 (1990) (“There 
is evidence . . . that summary judgment has moved beyond its 
originally intended role as a guarantor of the existence of 
material issues to be resolved at trial and has been transformed 
into a mechanism to assess plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing 
at trial.”).  Statistical analysis performed by the Federal 
Judicial Center supports these commentators’ claims and 
confirms that district courts are granting motions for summary 
judgment more frequently:  between 1975 and 2000, “the rate 
of cases with [summary judgment] motions granted in whole 
or in part, and the rate at which cases were terminated by 
summary judgment, doubled.”  Joe S. Cecil et al., Fed. Judicial 
Ctr., Trends in Summary Judgment Practice:  1975–2000, at 
20 (2007), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ 
summary_judgment_1975-2000.pdf. 
 Given the increasing frequency with which district 
courts utilize summary judgment to resolve federal civil 
litigation, in my view, the First Amendment public right of 
access that this Court extended to “records of civil 
proceedings,” Westinghouse, 949 F.2d at 659 (citing Publicker, 
733 F.2d at 1070), also extends to documents submitted in 
connection with motions for summary judgment.  As the 
Fourth Circuit recognized, “summary judgment adjudicates 
substantive rights and serves as a substitute for a trial,” and 
thus there is no principled basis to hold that the First 
Amendment right of public access extends to records of civil 
trials, but not records submitted in connection with motions for 
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summary judgment.  Rushford, 846 F.2d at 252.  Further, much 
of the Supreme Court’s rationale in Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986)—a 
seminal right-of-access case in which the Supreme Court held 
that the First Amendment right of public access extends not 
only to criminal trials, but also to preliminary hearings in 
criminal cases—applies with equal force to summary judgment 
proceedings.  Because of the modern trend toward resolving 
civil litigation through motions for summary judgment, in 
many cases, the summary-judgment stage “is often the final 
and most important step” of civil litigation.  Id. at 12.  Further, 
given that motions for summary judgment are adjudicated 
solely by judges, “the absence of a jury, long recognized as ‘an 
inestimable safeguard against . . . the compl[ia]nt, biased, or 
eccentric judge,’ . . . makes the importance of public access to 
[summary judgment proceedings] even more significant.”  Id. 
at 12–13 (citations omitted) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 145, 156 (1968)). 
 For the reasons stated above, the Court should hold that 
the First Amendment right of public access extends to 
documents submitted in connection with motions for summary 
judgment.  In light of the contemporary trend toward disposing 
of civil cases through summary judgment, the public should 
have a qualified right to view the documents submitted by 
parties in connection with motions for summary judgment.  As 
the Supreme Court has stated, “[p]eople in an open society do 
not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult 
for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing.”  
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 
(1980).  The public can only have confidence in the propriety 
of summary judgment procedure—which plays an increasingly 
important role in civil litigation—if the documents that form 
  
8 
the bases of district courts’ decisions to grant summary 
judgment are open for review and inspection, rather than 
shielded from public scrutiny. 
III. 
 In sum, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s 
application of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, which 
should only be invoked by a federal court when the court can 
decide a case on a “dispositive nonconstitutional ground.”  
Hagans, 415 U.S. at 547 (emphasis added).  The doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance is prudential in nature, yet its 
invocation in this case may lead to the imprudent result of 
piecemeal litigation while constitutional rights potentially are 
being violated on a continual basis.  Therefore, it is not only 
appropriate, but also necessary, for the Court to address the 
First Amendment issues raised by the plans at this juncture, and 
I would resolve the First Amendment issues in favor of 
transparency and broader public access to the federal courts. 
